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Abstract: We now have a paradoxical situation where the place and status of stories is in decline within 
the humanities, while scientists are increasingly recognizing their importance. Here the attitude towards 
narratives of these scientists is defended. It is argued that stories play a primordial role in human self-
creation, underpinning more abstract discourses such as mathematics, logic and science. To uphold the 
consistency of this claim, this thesis is defended by telling a story of the evolution of European culture 
from Ancient Greece to the present, including an account of the rise of the notion of culture and its 
relation to the development of history, thereby showing how stories function to justify beliefs, situate 
people as agents within history and orient them to create the future. 
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There is a peculiar inversion taking place between the sciences and the humanities. The 
humanities traditionally have given a central place to stories or narratives, either historical or 
fictional, and sought to defend them as offering at least an equivalent status in knowing the 
world to the mathematical thought and reductive analysis of the natural sciences. This defence 
runs from Giambattista Vico through Johann Herder and Wilhelm Dilthey to Paul Ricoeur 
and David Carr. This has been in opposition to the proponents of mathematical physics from 
René Descartes through to the logical positivists who have dismissed stories as at best a form of 
entertainment, at worst, as delusional. The human sciences traditionally have been divided 
between those who wished to reduce them to a branch of the natural sciences and exclude 
narrative as ‘unscientific’, and humanistic approaches celebrating human creativity, which have 
aligned themselves with the humanities and given a central place to narrative. But narratives 
are now under attack within literature, history and the humanities. There is a crisis of narrative 
in novels, while in film, narrative is being subordinated to the image.1 Perhaps more 
significantly, history has been in a crisis for some time, and a number of historians have 
1 On this, see Scott Lash, 'Discourse or Figure? Postmodernism as a "Regime of Signification"', Theory, Culture & 
Society, 5 (June 1988): 311-336; reprinted in Sociology of Postmodernism, (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.172-198, esp. p.191. 
www.cosmosandhistory.org  93 
                                                     
94 COSMOS AND HISTORY 
denigrated the cognitive claims of historical narratives.2 Postmodernists have embraced this 
decline in narratives, particularly metanarratives, as in some way liberating. It would seem that 
narratives, and the humanities, have finally been defeated by the cognitive claims of the 
scientists.  
Within the natural sciences, however, there is increasing disquiet about the ultimate goal of 
science to develop a mathematical ‘theory of everything’, and along with this, increasing 
skepticism about the role of mathematics within science.3 This skepticism has found eloquent 
expression in a short essay by Stuart Kaffman, ‘Emergence and Story: Beyond Newton, 
Einstein and Bohr?’ Kauffman points out that Newton, Einstein and Bohr shared the 
assumption that to explain anything we must first pre-state its configuration space; that is, the 
set of all possible solutions. In Newtonian mechanics we pre-state the initial and boundary 
conditions, the particles and force laws and with them, the configuration space. In the general 
theory of relativity the configuration space is the set of possible solutions given the initial and 
boundary conditions along with Einstein’s equations. In quantum mechanics we also pre-state 
the configuration space of all conceivable observables. But if the universe is really creative, and 
it seems that the biosphere in particular is creative, then it is impossible to pre-state its 
configuration space. In fact, Kauffman noted, biologists seldom do science as Newton taught, 
although they do so occasionally in limited domains. In the biological world, which includes 
biologists, things are more complex. As autonomous agents, people muck through, making a 
living, and to describe this, they tell stories. As Kauffman put it: 
If we cannot have all the categories that may be of relevance finitely prestated ahead of 
time, how else should we talk about the emergence of the biosphere or in our history – a 
piece of the biosphere – of new relevant categories, new functionalities, new ways of 
making a living? These are the doings of autonomous agents. Stories not only are relevant, 
they are how we tell ourselves what happened and its significance – its semantic import.4  
Kauffman began his paper by stating that ‘If story is not the stuff of science yet is about how we 
get on with making our ever-changing livings, then science, not story, must change.’5 He 
concluded this paper by offering a proof that it is impossible to pre-state the configuration space 
of the biosphere.  
2 See for example the essays in William H. Dray ed., Philosophical Analysis and History, (New York: New York 
University Press, 1966), the introduction to Hayden White, Metahistory, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1973), and papers in The History and Narrative Reader, ed. Geoffrey Roberts. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001). 
3 For a critique of the quest for a theory of everything, see John D. Barrow, Theories of Everything, (London: Vintage, 
1990), esp. p.210. For an expression of skepticism about the role of mathematics in science, see Jesper Hoffmeyer, 
Signs of Meaning in the Universe, trans. Barbara J. Haveland, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, p.38. On the 
limitations of mathematics as such, see Gregory J. Chaitin, The Limits of Mathematics. Singapore: Springer-Verlag, 
1998. 
4  Stuart Kauffman, ‘Emergence and Story: Beyond Newton, Einstein and Bohr?’, Investigations. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,  2000), chap.6, p.134f. 
5 Kauffman, ‘Emergence and Story’, p.119. 
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Does this mean that despite the surrender by humanist intellectuals, the proponents of the 
humanities had been right all along? This is the claim of the psychologist Jerome Bruner who 
argued that narrative stands alongside the domains of logic and science as a complementary 
mode of cognitive functioning; that is, a mode of organizing experience, of knowing the world 
and of reality construction.6 If this is the case, what is the relationship between these two modes 
of cognitive functioning? This is a more problematic question than it seems. How could it be 
answered? Given prevailing assumptions, an answer and its defence should be formulated 
through logic and science. But this is to prejudge the issue. It presupposes that logic and science 
are the ultimate reference points for judging the relevance of different discourses, precisely the 
position that is being questioned. If this assumption is wrong, then it will be self-contradictory 
and virtually impossible to answer the question in this way, since if stories are more primordial 
than logic and science it will be impossible to fully comprehend stories through logic and 
science. In fact, this is what I will argue in this paper. I will argue that stories are both 
ontologically and epistemologically more primordial than science. How could this be argued? 
The only logically consistent way is through a story. That is, through a story I will attempt to 
show that stories are more primordial than logic and science and provide the conditions for 
understanding not only what logic and science are, but also what stories are.  
In defending and characterizing stories in this way I will also defend something else: the 
notion of culture. That is, I will try to show through a story about the concept of culture and 
how it has developed, what both logic and science and stories are. In conclusion, I will argue 
that stories are primordial not only as means to organize our experience and understand the 
world, but to the process by which humans create themselves. The development of logic and 
science will be shown part of human self-creation dependent upon humans’ capacity to 
construct stories. To characterize the importance of stories and reveal their role in culture, I 
will construct a narrative of the development of the notion of culture, and then show the 
significance of stories within culture. At the same time this will provide an example of a story 
that will be used to illustrate the argument being presented.  
In constructing this narrative I will not trace the history of the term 'culture', something 
which has already been done,7 but rather the notion of culture, which pre-existed the term and 
which is associated with only one of a number of its meanings. This means constructing a 
narrative going back to Ancient Greece. Because of its scope, all I will offer is an extremely 
schematic narrative; but then this highlights another characteristic of narratives - that they can 
be schematised or filled out indefinitely.8 In a world where people are being intellectually 
crippled by masses of detailed knowledge jealously guarded by specialists, and all efforts to put 
6 Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, (Cambridge: Harvard Univeristy Press, 1986), esp. chap.2. Also 'The 
Narrative Construction of Reality', Critical Inquiry, 18 (Autumn, 1991): 1-21. 
7 See for instance Raymond Williams, "Culture" in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, (London: Fontana, 
1988), pp.87-93. 
8 For a fuller version of this narrative, see Arran Gare, Nihilism Inc. Environmental Destruction and the Metaphysics of 
Sustainability, (Sydney: Eco-Logical Press, 1996). 
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such knowledge in perspective is denigrated by conservative scholars and postmodernist 
theorists alike, the importance of this aspect of narratives cannot be overemphasized. Through 
this schematic narrative I will attempt to reveal the implications of the postmodern eclipse of 
narrative. I will suggest that this accounts at least in part for the passivity of the public and the 
withering of politics in the face of the rise of corporate power and the globalization of the 
economy.9 At the same time this essay will be a defense of those involved in the effort to 
rehabilitate narratives, including schematic narratives. 
THE DENIGRATION OF "CULTURE" 
History emerged in Ancient Greece along with philosophy. ‘Istoria’, from which both the 
terms ‘history’ and ‘story’ derive, meant ‘inquiry’, associated with investigation into the causes 
of conflicts, of failures and achievements, and holding people responsible for their actions. 
However, history, along with other narrative forms, was eclipsed by the development of 
philosophy. The first clear antecedent to the modern notion of culture is the ancient Greek 
characterization of nomos. As Carl Schmitt has argued, nomos originally meant decision and 
order in earthbound locations associated with land appropriation, having a foundation in God 
and containing a concrete order and a community.10 With the development of the notion of 
rationally knowable physis (or nature), however, nomos was reconceived in opposition to it as the 
laws imposed by people or created by agreement, connoting 'custom, convention or arbitrary 
law'. An early articulation of this opposition, revealing how it led to an appreciation of the 
diversity of customs (and a tendency to denigrate such diversity) was Xenophanes' argument 
that some views vary from society to society while others transcend any particular society: 
The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black, the Thracians that theirs 
have light blue eyes and red hair. But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able 
to draw with their hands and do the works that men can do, horses would draw the forms 
of gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they 
each had themselves.11 
Xenophanes used this argument to defend a monotheistic theology in which the one God, 'in 
no way similar to mortals either in body or thought' is discoverable through reason, and 
correspondingly, disparaged the epic poetry of Homer and the 'mythical' cosmogony of Hesiod. 
Xenophanes was the teacher of Parmenides, who took Xenophanes' ideas much further in 
distinguishing the way of belief or illusion from the way of truth arrived at through reason. 
Parmenides argued that the way of truth deals with what is, with being, which alone is real. 
Change implies coming into being from not-being, and since not-being is not, there can be no 
9 Carl Boggs, The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere, (New York: Guilford, 2000). 
10 Wolfgang Palaver, “Carl Schmitt on ‘Nomos’ and Space” Telos  106 (1996), pp. 105-127. See also G.L. Ulmen, 
“The Concept of ‘Nomos’: Introduction to Schmitt’s ‘Appropriation/Distribution/Production’” 95, (1993), pp.39-52.  
11 G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), p.169. 
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becoming. The appearance of becoming therefore must be an illusion. This argument, 
although modified considerably, was incorporated into Plato's philosophy, with poetry, drama 
and mythology being dismissed for dealing in illusions, emotions and what is changing or 
becoming, in contrast to mathematics and philosophy which have as their objects what is 
eternal or 'omni-temporal' - mathematical objects and the forms - all deriving from one 
ultimate form, the form of the Good.12 Plato's thought, reinterpreted by the Neoplatonists, was 
then synthesized with Hebraic thought by Christians, with the Good being identified with the 
Hebraic God. Arguably it was the primitive historical narratives of the Hebrews that gave 
Christianity its appeal, but such narratives were held to be subordinate to the eternal. As St 
Augustine put it: 
The education of the human race, represented by the people of God, has advanced, like 
that of an individual, through certain epochs, or, as it were, ages, so that it might gradually 
rise from earthly to heavenly things, and from the visible to the invisible.13 
Through history, people were to be educated to see the futility of the realm of change and 
becoming and to live for what is eternal. In the Christian culture which subsequently came to 
form the foundation of European civilization, the opposition between the realm of change or 
becoming dealt with by myths or stories, and the eternal revealed through reason or revelation, 
was upheld until the Renaissance, along with the denigration of the former and the exaltation 
of the latter. 
The Renaissance was characterized first and foremost by the revival of history. However, 
this revival of history along with Renaissance culture generally were eclipsed by the scientific 
revolution. The seventeenth century revival of Pythagorean Neoplatonism by Kepler, Galileo, 
Descartes and Newton associated with the new mechanical philosophy, what has come to be 
regarded as the birth of modern science, can be regarded as a reaffirmation of eternal 
knowledge in the face of growing interest in diversity and change. Descartes claimed to have 
formulated and systematized a new method for acquiring knowledge in place of the authority of 
tradition, dogma, faith, superstition and prejudice. Modeled on mathematical thinking, and 
analytical geometry in particular, this new method was combined with a rejection of dialectical 
thought as a means of reasoning from reputable opinions to conclusions, of the use of metaphor 
and other rhetorical devices, and of the claims of history and historical narratives to 
knowledge.14 The rise of the new science was also associated with the quest for a perfect 
12 On this see Jaakko Hintikka, 'Knowledge and its Object in Plato', Knowledge and the Known, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1974). 
13 Saint Augustine The City of God, trans. Marcus Dodds, (New York: Random House: 1950), Bk 10, chap.14. For the 
identification of the heavenly, invisible things with the eternal, see Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk I, XXII, 
20; trans. D.W. Robertson, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p.18. 
14 See Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, especially Rule Ten. Stephen Toulmin in Cosmopolis: The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), has revealed the social significance of this. 
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language, a language that would accurately represent the world.15 Retrospectively, this is 
equated with the move not only beyond myth, but also beyond philosophy, and the attainment 
of truly objective knowledge of reality, knowledge of the eternal laws of motion of immutable 
matter. 
Hobbes took Descartes' mechanical view of the world to its logical conclusion, representing 
humans as complex machines in which all thinking is calculation, adding and subtracting in the 
service of control of the world to satisfy appetites and avoid aversions. Language is a means to 
extend the power of such thinking, to register what we find to be the causes of things, to convey 
this knowledge to others and to convey our purposes to others. Science is the extension of such 
knowledge and calculation. Societies are mechanical bodies formed by aggregations of egoistic 
individuals who have entered a contract to obey the covenants of society for their common 
benefit, and who, through their constrained egoism, keep the cogs of society turning. The only 
basis for ethics, for claiming rights and accepting duties, is enlightened egoism. Narratives, 
along with poetry and drama were given a place, "to please and delight our selves, and others, 
by playing with our words, for pleasure and ornament, innocently."16 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth century this conception of the world was given added 
appeal through the addition of a simulated narrative of development - economic progress 
generated by self interest and, more broadly, progress in nature and in human history through 
the generation of diverse organizations of matter and their selection through the struggle for 
survival. Present day reductionist science which strives for a set of mathematical equations to 
account for everything in the universe, logical empiricism, neo-classical economics, socio-
biology and cognitive psychology modeling human thinking on computers, are merely the late 
twentieth century developments of this world-view. In this scheme of things, customs, 
conventions and traditions are of little significance unless they can be used to promote tourism 
or sell things. Narratives are even less important. Historical narratives are nothing more than 
decorations surrounding factual statements about the past, and fictional narratives are playing 
with words, forms of amusement. Hobbes' philosophy has been embodied by society and reigns 
supreme. 
THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO 
All this is not to say that narratives have not played an important part throughout the 
history of European civilization. And at various times they have been explicitly defended. 
Aristophanes ridiculed Socrates while extolling the teachings of drama. In contrast to Plato, 
Aristotle allowed that narratives have significance, but only as subordinate to philosophy. More 
importantly, narratives in various forms have been crucial to all social and intellectual life, and 
the history of European civilization is characterized by the continuous innovation in the genres 
15 See M. Slaughter, Universal Languages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). 
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, [1651], (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), Part I, chap.4, p.102. 
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of both historical and fictional narrative.17 The term "narrative" itself originated in rhetoric and 
originally had no connection with storytelling. Its development into a form of storytelling was 
itself a development in the form of narrative.18 But even through rhetoric, narratives did not 
gain the status of discourses aiming at knowledge of the eternal. It was only with the rise of the 
new mechanical philosophy in the seventeenth century with its thoroughgoing denigration of 
narrative knowledge that the first major intellectual defence of narratives was made. The 
defender was Giambattista Vico (1668-1744). 
Vico was one of the first and one of the greatest ever opponents of mechanical philosophy. 
He not only opposed the dismissal of metaphor and rhetoric, of history, and imagination, but 
turned his attention to precisely those aspects of human reality which had been dismissed by 
the mainstream of European culture - customs, conventions, traditions and stories. Rejecting 
the view of society as an atomistic collection of mechanical egoists and defending in its place a 
conception of individual minds as the product of historically developing societies, Vico can be 
regarded as the founder of the science of culture.19 In opposition to Descartes' science of nature 
and his conception of the mind as a thinking substance, Vico claimed to have created a New 
Science of the socio-historical world, and argued for the superiority of the kind of knowledge, 
historical knowledge, attainable through this science over any knowledge that could be gained 
of nature. It is only what we have made that we can truly know, that is, know 'from the inside' 
rather than the outside.20 Mathematics is transparent to us not because it belongs to a 
supersensible realm of being behind changing appearances, but because it is a human 
construction. It is possible for us to know works of art, political schemes, legal systems and 
history, to understand motives, purposes, ambitions, hopes, jealousies, outlooks and visions of 
reality for the same reason. We can grasp the thoughts, the attitudes, the beliefs, the worlds of 
thought and feeling of societies dead and gone through language, myths and rites. Totally 
rejecting the view of language as a means to accurately represent reality, Vico held language to 
be the key to the entire mental, social and cultural life of societies. We think in symbols, and 
ideas are inseparable from the symbols by which they are expressed. We can infer mental 
processes from words and the way they are used, for 'genius is the product of language, not 
17 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948) is still one of the best general 
histories of history. The rise of the novel from earlier forms of narrative, its development and its significance have 
been described by Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). For a shorter history told from a different perspective, see Mikhail 
Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Michael 
Holquist ed., (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). 
18 As noted by C. Jan Swearington in "Narration of Dialogue and Narration Within Dialogue: The Transition from 
Story to Logic", Narrative Thought and Narrative Language, (Hillside, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1990), pp.173-97. 
19 This is not to say that Vico had no antecedents. His work can be understood as a development of the historical 
school of legal scholarship, and was also influenced by Bacon. On Vico's antecedents, see B.A. Haddock, An 
Introduction to Historical Thought, (London: Edward Arnold, 1980), chap.6. 
20 The New Science of Giambattista Vico, [3rd ed. 1744] trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), par.331. p.96. 
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language of genius.'21 We are able to enter the mentality of people very different from our own 
because we possess the faculty of fantasia - imagination - which allows us to appreciate more 
than one way of categorizing reality. By contrast, it is only possible to describe nature, to 
predict how it will behave in different situations. It is not possible to know why it behaves as it 
does. 
At the same time Vico attacked Descartes' quest for perfect, incorrigible, timeless truths 
which could be expressed in universally intelligible symbols available to everyone, at any time, 
in any circumstance. In its place he proposed a 'genetic' approach to knowledge, arguing that 
the validity of all true knowledge, even that of mathematics and logic, can only be 
demonstrated by showing how it has been created, that is, by revealing through an historical 
narrative its genesis. Natural law theorists and social contract theorists have gone radically 
astray in striving to demonstrate the ethical basis of law through abstract reasoning based on 
some postulated eternal human nature, since human nature is a process continually 
transforming itself, and so is constantly generating new needs and new categories of thought 
and action. Modern law, together with such concepts as justice, rights and obligations, is the 
outcome of a long history of cultural evolution, and the validity, the value and prospects of law, 
these concepts and the ethical claims based upon them, can only be determined through the 
study of their historical background and genesis. For Vico, notions such as 'obedience to 
universal reason', the 'social contract', or the 'calculation of self-interest', are implausible myths, 
merely the refuge of ignorance.  
More broadly, Vico began the schism between thinkers for whom the primary concern is 
with the specific and the unique, and those in the Cartesian tradition whose concern is with the 
repetitive and the universal. This opposition is correlated with concern for the concrete rather 
than the abstract, with change and perpetual movement rather than rest, with the inner rather 
than the outer aspect of reality, with quality rather than quantity, with what is culture-bound 
rather than with timeless principles, and with mental strife and self-transformation rather than 
with the possibility, or even desirability of eternal peace, order, harmony and the satisfaction of 
all rational human wishes. However, Vico did not totally reject the concerns of Cartesian 
thinkers. He allowed them a legitimate, though subordinate place; but a place which can only 
be justified historically. 
CULTURE FROM HERDER TO HEGEL 
Vico was virtually ignored until very similar ideas had been developed independently by 
Herder (1744 - 1803) in Germany.22 However, while Vico was only concerned with European 
21 Giambattista Vico, On the Study Methods of Our Time, [1709] trans. Elio Gianturco, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990), p.40. 
22 See Johann Gottfried Herder, On World History, ed. Hans Adler and Ernest A. Menze, trans. Ernest A. Menze 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). For a succinct statement of Herder's ideas on humanity see Isaiah Berlin, Vico and 
Herder, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1976). For a more in depth treatment, see F.M. Barnard, Herder’s Social and 
Political Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. 
                                                     
 ARRAN GARE  101    
history, Herder wrote on the history of all humanity, and also offered an alternative view of 
nature consistent with his conception of humans. To defend human diversity, Herder 
appropriated the term 'culture', and used the plural to emphasize the differences between 
societies. In opposition to the Hobbesian conception of humans, he argued that we are both 
culturally formed by and participants in the creation of our particular cultures. To justify his 
rejection of the mechanistic view of humans, Herder rejected the mechanistic view of nature, 
conceiving it instead as a unity in which dynamic, purpose seeking forces - the interplay of 
which constitutes all movement and growth - flow into each other, clash, combine and 
coalesce.23 Human life was then understood with reference to its physical and geographical 
environment conceived in such terms, but at the same time, all human activity was seen as the 
expression of individuals or groups striving to actualize their own unique potentialities. The 
challenge for each society and civilization is to discover its own centre of gravity and then to 
actualize its potential. All aspects of a particular people, the way they speak, move, eat, drink; 
their laws, architecture, theology and social outlook, their music and dance forms, and in 
particular their language, were seen to be pervaded by and to express patterns and qualities 
unique to their cultures so that each aspect of a culture reflects the whole culture. In opposition 
to the individualism of more conservative Enlightenment philosophers, Herder argued that 
individuality is only achieved by participation in and expressing the particular culture through 
which one's humanity has been attained. To speak and think requires language, it is to 'swim in 
an inherited stream of images and words; we must accept these media on trust: we cannot 
create them.'24 All human activity was seen as expressing the total personality of individuals or 
groups, with self-realization being the richest and most harmonious form of self-expression, 
which is what all people, whether they are aware of it or not, live for. With this notion of 
humanity it was the creativity of people that was emphasised, and people were seen to be living 
in worlds which they themselves had largely created. The most important members of society 
are its artists. According to Herder, 'A poet is a creator of a people; he gives it a world to 
contemplate...'25 The reason for studying societies is not to control them but to appreciate their 
uniqueness, and at the same time to inspire people to realize their own unique potentialities. 
The egoistic individualism taken to be the defining characteristic of humanity by 
Enlightenment philosophers was held to be, along with the mechanical world-view, merely the 
culture of one defective society. As he wrote in Letters on the Advancement of Mankind (1793-7) 'Our 
part of the earth should be called not the wisest, but the most arrogant, aggressive, money-
minded: what it has given [the rest of humankind] is not civilization but the destruction of the 
rudiments of their own cultures wherever they could achieve this.'26  
23 For Herder's views on nature and the influence of these see H.B. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of 
Science, (Cambridge: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1970). 
24 Cited Berlin, Vico and Herder, p.168. 
25 Cited ibid. p.203. 
26 Cited ibid. p.160. 
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It was Herder who inspired the comparative study of language, literature, folktales and 
myths of both Europeans and non-Europeans, and the development of history and historical 
method, including hermeneutics, in nineteenth century Germany.27 He also inspired the 
Naturphilosophen, who argued for a non-mechanistic view of nature. Such developments led to 
efforts to create the new syntheses of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the most important of which 
was Hegel. Hegel is important for (among other things), identifying three dimensions to culture. 
Rejecting Kant's notion of the preformed ego, the 'I' represented as a pure unity relating to 
itself, Hegel portrayed it as something which emerges in the development of the human 
organism from immediate sensitivity to self-consciousness through participation in the social 
and cultural life of society. In his early lectures he argued that the formative process of spirit or 
culture through which human organisms transcend their immediate engagement in the world 
to become egos, consists in three interdependent dialectical patterns: symbolic representation 
which operates through the medium of language; interaction on the basis of reciprocity of 
recognition which operates through moral relations; and the labour process which operates 
through the tool.28 In his historical works Hegel attempted to show how the interweaving of 
these dialectical patterns, neither reducible to nor autonomous from each other, constitute the 
dynamics of societies.29 At the same time these historical narratives were used by Hegel to 
legitimate the political institutions and cultural achievements of his own time by showing how 
they provided the vantage point and perspective from which past political institutions and 
cultural developments could be understood and evaluated. 
With the characteristic penchant for reductionism of the Western intellectual tradition, 
each of these three dialectical patterns has been proposed by different thinkers as the basis of all 
cultural dynamics. As Jürgen Habermas pointed out: 
Ernst Cassirer takes the dialectic of representation and makes it the guiding principle of a 
Hegelianized Kant interpretation, which at the same time is the foundation of a 
philosophy of symbolic forms. Georg Lukács interprets the movement of intellectual 
development from Kant to Hegel along the guide-line presented by the dialectic of labour, 
which at the same time guarantees the materialistic unity of subject and object in the 
world-historical formative process of the human species; finally, the neo-Hegelianism of a 
27 As Hans-Georg Gadamer argued in Truth and Method 2nd rev. ed., trans. revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
G. Marshall, (New York: Continuum, 1993), chap.1. 
28 Jena Lectures of 1803-04 and 1805-06. The 1803-04 lectures have been translated in G.W.F. Hegel, System of Ethical 
Life and First Philosphy of Spirit, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), pp.206-234 and the 1805-6 lectures 
in Hegel and the Human Spirit, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983). The lectures have been critically 
examined by Jürgen Habermas in 'Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind, in Theory and 
Practice [1971] trans. John Viertel, (London: Heinemann, 1974), pp.142-169. The threefold division derives ultimately 
from the Pythagorean division between lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour and lovers of gain.  
29 In Hegel's mature work this division was subordinated to the division between Subjective, Objective and Absolute 
Spirit. However, contrary to Habermas' claim (ibid.) Hegel continued to give a central place to these struggles, 
particularly the struggle for recognition. On this see Robert R. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997). See also Axel Honneth The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). 
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thinker such as Theodor Litt leads to a conception of the stepwise self-development of 
spirit which follows the pattern of the struggle for recognition.30 
More recently, the structuralists (and some post-structuralists) have attempted to reduce the 
dynamics of all culture to the 'dialectic or representation' - the operation of language and other 
systems of signs, most Western Marxists have followed Lukács and located the source of all 
cultural dynamics in the labour process, while symbolic interactionists and neo-Marxists, 
following George Herbert Mead, have located the dynamics of society in the struggle for 
recognition.31  
EMERGENT FORMS IN CULTURE 
What I am suggesting is not that all studies of culture have their roots in Hegel, or for that 
matter in Vico and Herder. The French tradition of cultural inquiry from Montesquieu 
through Durkheim to Lévi-Strauss, and the Anglophone tradition from the Scottish 
philosophical historians through Herbert Spencer, appear to have been developed largely 
independently of German thought. However, there have been no developments in the study of 
culture which cannot be seen as elaborating on one or another of the dialectical patterns 
identified by Hegel, or on some aspect of the relationship between these patterns. 
This is not to claim that all aspects of human life can be understood in terms of the weaving 
of these three dialectical patterns of culture. Marx was important for revealing that the 
categories of economics, claimed by English economists to be part of the natural order of 
things, were part of a particular, and perhaps historically transient, culture. But Marx also 
argued that the market system, while based on culture, has developed dynamics of its own 
irreducible to the dynamics of culture.32 And Georg Simmel generalized this insight, arguing 
that it is not only socio-economic formations which had dynamics of their own. As he 
proclaimed:  
Whenever life progresses beyond the animal level of culture, an internal contradiction 
appears... We speak of culture whenever life produces certain forms in which it expresses 
and realizes itself... But although these forms arise out of the life process, because of their 
unique constellation they do not share the restless rhythm of life, its ascent and descent, its 
constant renewal, its incessant divisions and reunifications... They acquire fixed identities, 
a logic and lawfulness of their own; this new rigidity inevitably places them at a distance 
30 Habermas, 'Labour and Interaction', in Theory and Practice, p.157f. 
31 There has been a resurgence of interest in Mead's work in this regard within Germany. See for example, Hans 
Joas, G.H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-Examination of his Thought, trans. Raymond Meyer, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1985). 
32 Essentially, the market system of capitalism is an autonomous system emerging out of and then transforming the 
dialectic of labour. The dialectic of labour is itself a cultural process, as Aleksandr Bogdanov argued. See K.M. 
Jensen, Beyond Marx and Mach: Aleksandr Bogdanov's Philosophy of Living Experience (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978). 
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from the spiritual dynamic which created them and which makes them independent... This 
characteristic of cultural processes was first noted in economic change.33 
Simmel set himself the task of examining the micro-forms which transcend dialectical 
processes, and social theorists since then have identified and examined the dynamics of a 
diversity of such formations (from Robert Michel's 'iron law of oligarchy' to Michel Foucault's 
'discursive formations' and Pierre Bourdieu's 'cultural fields'). Other social theorists have 
attempted to analyse the relationships between diverse social formations.34 
Recognizing all three dialectical patterns together with the emergent cultural forms with 
their own dynamics in complex interaction with each other still does not do justice to the 
complexity of humanity. Individuals are more than products of biological, cultural and social 
dynamics. Clearly on the view that humans are cultural beings implies that they only become 
individuals through being encultured and socialized into these emergent forms. But individuals, 
like the dialectical patterns of culture and like social forms become, at least in some cases, more 
than the conditions of their emergence. They become, to some extent, self-determining. This is 
the aspect of humans on which existentialists, from Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty, focussed. 
THE CONFLICT OF TRADITIONS AND THE NEW SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
The conception of humans as cultural beings presented here is clearly at odds with the 
tradition which originated with Xenophanes in which 'culture' is denigrated as the realm of 
belief and illusion in opposition to the way of truth - knowledge of God, of the forms, or of the 
laws of science. Until recently we have had an opposition between the humanities, concerned 
to understand, appropriate and critically reflect on our cultural heritage, in which humans have 
been seen as cultural beings, and the sciences, which have been concerned to acquire objective 
knowledge. Sociology, psychology and geography have been in the peculiar position of 
containing this dichotomy within their disciplines. What is the essence of this opposition? Partly 
it is the opposition between those committed to acknowledging the uniqueness of humans, and 
the uniqueness of different peoples and different individuals, and to showing how such 
uniqueness might be fully realized, and those committed to reductionist explanations enabling 
predictions to be made and control established over their objects of investigation. But there is a 
more fundamental opposition - and this should have become evident from my narrative - 
between those who have seen the world as a creative process of becoming and those who 
regard the experience of such time as an illusion, who are striving for timeless truths. In the 
past, efforts to defend a distinctive approach to the human sciences have not been taken very 
33 Georg Simmel, 'The Conflict in Modern Culture', in Donald N. Levine ed. George Simmel on Individual and Social 
Forms, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp.375-393, p.375f. 
34 Ferndand Braudel has provided the best theoretical analysis of such social complexity using the notion of multiple 
times and multiple spaces. See Braudel 'History and the Social Sciences', On History, (Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press, 
1980), pp.25-54. 
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seriously, at least in Anglophone nations, because if the 'scientific' view of reality were valid, 
then the humanities, assuming humans to be in process of becoming, are dealing in illusions. 
However, in this century the natural sciences are undergoing a transformation. Herder's 
anti-mechanistic conception of nature is coming of age. As Ilya Prigogine has argued: 'we are in 
a period of scientific revolution - one in which the very position and meaning of the scientific 
approach are undergoing reappraisal - a period not unlike the birth of the scientific approach in 
ancient Greece or of its renaissance in the time of Galileo.'35 This revolution involves 
recognizing the priority of becoming over being, of the irreducibility of complexity, and that 
we, as conscious subjects, are part of reality being investigated. The original French title of 
Prigogine and Stenger's book Order out of Chaos was The New Alliance, implying that the natural 
sciences are now aligned with the humanities.36 Such developments have been taking place 
mainly in the physical sciences, giving rise to the odd situation described by the quantum 
physicist David Bohm where: 
... just when physics is moving away from mechanism, biology and psychology are moving 
closer to it. If this trend continues it may well be that scientists will be regarding living and 
intelligent beings as mechanical, while they suppose that inanimate matter is too complex 
and subtle to fit into the limited categories of mechanism.37 
 Since then, there has developed an increasingly strong stream of anti-mechanistic, anti-
reductionist thinking in biology and neuro-physiology fueled by developments in complexity 
theory partly inspired by the work of Prigogine.38 Gerald Edelman, the Nobel Laureate at the 
forefront of neurophysiolgical research has argued for the reality of the consciousness, and 
conceived this as not only an emergent phenomenon of the brain (as did Roger Sperry) but also 
of culture.39 Human life is seen as an emergent phenomenon, or rather, complex of 
phenomena, irreducible to and inexplicable in terms of the conditions of its emergence.40 This 
involves the capacity of humans to orient themselves through stories, and we now have a 
science which justifies such a view of humans and justifies a central place to story-telling.41 And 
what we are now seeing is recognition that stories have a place in describing nature itself, since 
35 Ilya Prigogine, From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences, (San Francisco: Freeman, 1980), 
p.xiif. 
36 See Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, 'The New Alliance', Scientia, 112, (1977): 319-332. 
37 David Bohm, 'Some Remarks on the Notion of Order' in Towards a Theoretical Biology, 2 Sketches, ed. C.H 
Waddington, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), p.34. 
38 An overview of the history of theories of evolution showing the recent advances in anti-reductionist thinking, see 
David J. Depew and Bruce H. Weber, Darwinism Evolving, (Cambridge Mass. M.I.T. Press, 1996). 
39 In particular see Gerald Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind, (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 
1992). 
40 For a survey of such ideas, see Brian Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity, (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994). 
41 As Alicia Juarrero has argued in Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behaviour as a Complex System, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2002), esp. chap.14. 
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only stories can interpret a world that is really creative and gives a place to autonomous agents 
endowed with endogenous activity.42 
SCIENCE, TRUTH AND NARRATIVE 
Where does this leave science's claim to be objective truth? Partly this was based on the 
commitment to prediction and to representing 'creative becoming'43 as an illusion of the senses 
which could be overcome by reason and mathematics; in other words, to grasp the eternal 
reality behind changing appearances. What is the status of claims to knowledge which extol the 
limits to prediction and affirm the reality of creative becoming? To begin with, logical 
positivism which made prediction and the eternal realm of logical truths central to its 
celebration of science and denigration of the humanities failed in its attempt to ground 
mathematics in logic, or to find a form of logic which is beyond further questioning. Then its 
characterization of science was shown to be a total misrepresentation of how science actually 
operates by historically oriented philosophers of science. So not only did it become evident that 
logical positivists were not been able to ground claims to knowledge in some absolute, but it was 
shown that what scientists do is much more like what the humanist intellectuals do - they try to 
understand the world.44 Critics of logical positivism thus confirmed the Vicovian insights of 
Benedetto Croce, that scientific activity is itself an historical process, with each experiment, 
each observation, each publication and each reading of a publication being historical events 
which must be appreciated as such for science to be possible.45 And the ultimate goal of inquiry 
is to understand particular historical events and to bring them to life in the present. These 
insights generated a major problem, which once understood, could be resolved by appeal to the 
same Vicovian tradition. How can we choose between different ways of understanding the 
world? Here we find the traditional charge of those committed to discovering eternal truths 
against convention, customs and narratives, and against the humanities, the charge of 
relativism. It is at this point that it was realized that it is only through narrative that it is possible 
to escape relativism. Supporting Vico's claim for the priority of rhetoric over logic and 
mathematical abstraction, Alasdair MacIntyre showed how the acceptance of radically new 
theories is dependent upon the capacity of their defenders to construct narratives in terms of 
their theories. Since major advances in knowledge transcend old assumptions and create new 
ways of arguing, changing the standards of relevance and proof, they cannot be evaluated in 
terms of existing criteria. The superiority of the new theories is only revealed by the 
42 See Anton Markoš, ‘In the quest for novelty: Kauffman’s biosphere and Lotman’s semiosphere’, Sign Systems Studies: 
32.1/2, 2004. 
43 The notion of 'creative becoming' derives from Bergson and Whitehead. 
44 On this see Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1958), and 
Maurice Finocciaro, 'Scientific Discoveries as Growth of Understanding', T. Nickles ed. Scientific Discovery, Logic and 
Rationality, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), pp.235-255. 
45 For a brief but excellent characterization of Croce’s ideas, see Collingwood, The Idea of History, op.cit. pp.190-204. 
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comprehension they facilitate of the achievements and limitations of the theories transcended. 
As Alasdair MacIntyre pointed out: 
Wherein lies the superiority of Galileo to his predecessors? The answer is that he, for the 
first time, enables the work of all his predecessors to be evaluated by a common set of 
standards. The contributions of Plato, Aristotle, the scholars at Merton College, Oxford 
and Padua, the work of Copernicus himself at last all fall into place. Or to put matters in 
another and equivalent way: the history of late medieval science can finally be cast into a 
coherent narrative.... What the scientific genius, such as Galileo, achieves in his transitions, 
then, is not only a new way of understanding nature, but also and inseparably a new way 
of understanding the old sciences way of understanding... It is from the stand-point of the 
new science that the continuities of narrative history are reestablished.46 
Once this had been pointed out it became blindingly obvious that all those philosophers 
and scientists of the past who claimed to have discovered some absolute object of or foundation 
for knowledge, from Plato to Descartes and to Bertrand Russell, had only been able to explain 
and defend their claims through precisely the narrative forms they denigrated.47 In fact what 
distinguishes a discipline as a genuine 'science', a body of knowledge and research programmes 
which can be said to advance, is that it has historians producing narratives through which 
various claims to knowledge are evaluated, problems defined and members of the discipline 
oriented for research. The new science being developed by Prigogine and others is defensible 
because it has provided the basis for a new narrative that reveals both the achievements and 
limitations of the natural science of the past, and through this, reveals how the new science is 
advancing beyond it.48 But perhaps more importantly from the perspective of the humanities 
and cultural inquiry, this narrative can situate and explain why the humanities and 
humanistically oriented human sciences in which the reductionist methods of the natural 
sciences have been eschewed have achieved such penetrating insights, while those who have 
attempted to model their disciplines on their understanding of the natural sciences have gained 
such paltry results. 
WHAT ARE NARRATIVES? 
What then are narratives? While narratives have been studied sporadically since Aristotle, it 
has only been in recent decades that sustained efforts have been made to comprehend what 
narratives as such are (although these more recent studies of narrative were foreshadowed by 
46 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science.' Monist, 60, (1977): 
459-60 & 467. 
47 J.M. Bernstein has shown how Descartes' defence of the suspension of narrative and historical legitimation is 
legitimated narratively. See The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukacs, Marxism and the Dialectics of Form, (Brighton, Harvester 
Press, 1984), pp.157-79. 
48 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers Order out of Chaos (Toronto: Bantam Books) and Depew and Weber Darwinism 
Evolving each provide such narratives. For another example, see Gerry Webster and Brian Goodwin, Form and 
Transformation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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literary theorists in Russia in the 1920s). Structuralist semiotics has been partly responsible for 
this because examination of the way components of communication are organized from the 
phoneme and the morpheme upwards virtually demanded an examination of the way larger 
units are organized in discourses; and the most significant form of discourse is the narrative. In 
attending to narratives they also came to realize their ubiquity. As Roland Barthes noted: 
The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious 
variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances - as though any 
material were fit to receive man's stories. ... [N]arrative is present in myth, legend, fable, 
tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting ... stained glass 
windows, cinema, comics, news item, conversation. ... [N]arrative is international, 
transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself.'49  
However, the structuralists ultimately failed to characterize the nature of narratives in 
structuralist terms, and, more importantly, failed to explain their ubiquity or to reveal their 
importance to human life.50 The service they performed was to provide a point of departure for 
others, most importantly for Paul Ricoeur and David Carr.51 For Ricoeur, narrative is the 
fundamental structure of the experience of time.52 Its ultimate referent is lived time. At the 
same time narrative is central to human creativity. Innovations are made by inventing plots by 
means of which 'goals, causes, and chance are brought together within the temporal unity of 
whole and complete action.'53 A complete action can consist of a number of other actions. It can 
be the action of an individual - from some particular achievement to having lived a whole life, 
or of a group, such building a house or winning a war, founding a nation or establishing or 
destroying a civilization.54  
49 Roland Barthes, 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives' in Image, Music, Text, (London: Fontana 
Press, 1977), pp.79-124. 
50 This is not to say that the work on narrative by Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Greimas, Todorov and Genette has not been 
important, but most narratologists now accept that their work leaves out what is most important about narrative. On 
this see Art Berman, From the New Criticism to Deconstruction, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp.122-132. 
However, the defects of the structuralists had already been identified in the Russian formalists by M.M. Bakhtin and 
P.N. Medvedev in The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship, [1928], trans. Albert J. Wehrle, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), chap.6. 
51 Ricoeur is not the only important 'post-structuralist' narratologist, but his theory of narrative encompasses almost 
all the insights of other theorists (with the possible exceptions of Bakhtin and Carr). 
52 Ricoeur defines his relationship to structuralism in 'What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding', Hermeneutics 
and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. by John B. Thompson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This 
relationship closely parallels the relationship between Bakhtin/Medvedev and the formalists. 
53 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 volumes [1983-84], (Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press, 1984-85), Vol. I, ix. There 
are significant differences between historical and fictional narratives, which are addressed by Ricoeur in Volumes II 
and III, but for our present purposes these can be disregarded. 
54 The way in which actions are integrated into broader actions, both of individuals and groups, and the connection 
between this and the structure of narratives, has been carefully analysed by David Carr in Time, Narrative, and History, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
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According to Ricoeur there are three moments of mimesis in narrative - prefiguration, 
configuration and refiguration.55 Firstly, life itself is prefigured as an inchoate narrative. It is for 
this reason that we have a pre-understanding of what human action is, of its semantics, its 
symbolism, its temporality. The second moment of mimesis involves the representation of 
action according to specific rules of emplotment, that is, the making of a structure to configure 
this pre-understanding. Through the activity of emplotment a quasi-world of action and 
characters is generated. The third moment of mimesis is the reception and actualization of that 
structure. People are confronted with and drawn into the quasi-world, distancing them from 
their own life-worlds, revealing and challenging their taken for granted horizons of expectations 
to refigure their worlds.56 They are provided with room to manoeuvre, to think about the way 
they construe their worlds and the way they live.57 They are able to refigure their worlds and 
their lives by appropriating the new structure.58 The clearest exemplification of the relationship 
between these three moments of mimesis in narrative occurred in Russia in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries as novelists based their characters and stories on real people, and 
individuals openly modelled their lives on fictional characters and their stories.59  
THE ROLE OF NARRATIVES IN CULTURE 
With narrative thus briefly characterized, we can now consider what role narratives play in 
culture. To begin with, producing and telling stories are obviously a major component of the 
dialectic of representation. It could be argued to have a privileged place since human life is 
already organized by narratives and people are already living their lives as inchoate narratives. 
As Vico argued, we can understand the human world better because it is a human creation. 
Historical narratives are therefore a major component of the dialectic of representation. But 
more importantly, in the light of the failure of efforts to solve the problems of epistemology 
through logic, and the recognition of the role of narrative in rationality, narratives must be 
regarded as the matrix within which all other forms of representation must be legitimated.60 
55 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, chap.3. 'Mimesis', usually taken to mean 'imitation', is accorded a more creative 
function in Ricoeur's philosophy.  
56 The notion of 'horizon of expectations', deriving from Husserl and Gadamer, is more fully developed by Hans 
Jauss than Ricoeur in his 'Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory', Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. 
Timothy Bahi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). 
57 As Ross Chambers argued in Room for Maneuver, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
58 Strangely, Ricoeur was concerned with the refiguring of people's worlds, and dealt with the refiguring of their lives 
only as an afterthought. David Carr is more forceful on the relation between narratives and action than Ricoeur. On 
the differences and similarities between Ricoeur and Carr, see the debate between them in David Wood ed., On Paul 
Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). 
59 See Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
chap.2, and Gare, Nihilism Inc., chap.10. 
60 An argument somewhat along these lines has been made by Walter R. Fisher in Human Communication as Narration: 
Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 
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That the dialectic of recognition and the medium of moral relations through which it 
operates are conditioned by the dialectic of representation was acknowledged by Hegel and by 
those who have followed him most closely, for instance Theodor Litt, George Herbert Mead 
and Axel Honneth. Jacques Lacan, following Emile Benveniste, argued the dialectic of 
representation is so basic to the formation of identity that it can be virtually reduced to it. For 
Lacan the subject is strung along by the unfolding of the signifying chain.61 It is through names, 
pronouns and labels that individuals are constituted as subjects and moral agents. However, the 
relation between the dialectics of representation and recognition is much more complex than 
Lacan allowed.62 One is not situated in social space as a moral agent simply through individual 
words, but through narratives. As Alasdair MacIntyre argued:  
I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 'Of 
what story or stories do I find myself a part?' We enter human society, that is, with one or 
more imputed characters - roles into which we have been drafted - and we have to learn 
what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our 
responses to them are apt to be construed. It is through hearing stories ... that children 
learn or mislearn what a child and what a parent is, what the caste of characters may be in 
the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are. Deprive 
children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions and in 
their words.63  
Social groups through which individuals are recognized and granted an identity, from 
friendships to political movements and from business organizations to nations, are constituted 
by narratives. 
Finally, while the dialectic of labour operating through the medium of the tool is often 
taken to be not only independent of the other two dialectical patterns and sometimes as the sole 
basis of the dynamism of society, the kind of co-operation required for the use, let alone further 
development of all but the most elementary tools would be impossible without an orientation to 
the world and the structuring of social relationships through the dialectics of representation and 
recognition embodying and utilizing narratives. Complex projects of joint action, involving the 
integration of a number of subordinate actions, take the form of a narrative and must be 
narrated by the actors to coordinate their actions with each other. This precedes its recounting 
by the actors or by others to a broader public. The simplest forms of joint action are 
hierarchically organized with people being reduced to instruments of the leader’s project or 
projects. Such narratives are ‘monologic’. Democratically organized joint projects must 
encompass the arguments between people with diverse perspectives and interests to reach a 
consensus on what goals to pursue and how to pursue them. Such narratives are ‘polyphonic’.  
61 In Écrits, (London: Routledge, 1989), p.316, Lacan claims 'A signifier is that which represents the subject for 
another signifier.' 
62 As is evident from the work of Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. 
63 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 2nd ed. 1984), p.216. 
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What is the relationship between narratives and emergent forms that have taken on a life of 
their own? These are in constant tension. In taking on a life of their own social forms transform 
the conditions of their emergence, that is, associations of humans as cultural beings, 
transforming them into instruments of their own functioning. People participating in such 
forms might still define their participation in terms of narratives, but these will not be integrated 
into a narrative defining the goal of the formation, and are likely to be in irreconcilable conflict 
with the narratives of other participants in the formation. For instance as organizations become 
bureaucratized the narratives on which they are based tend to disintegrate, their goals tend to 
lose definition, and careerists totally indifferent to these goals, conceiving their actions in terms 
of their own personal advancement and their power struggles, not only penetrate such 
institutions, but displace those who take the original goals of the organization seriously. 
Members of such institutions ‘lose the plot’. Those people claiming to be social scientists who 
model their approach on what now must be regarded as the misrepresentation of an outmoded 
form of natural science - notably mainstream economists and reductionist psychologists - are 
effectively instruments of such forms - and usually careerists. They are in opposition to those 
who are struggling to reformulate narratives which will subordinate such forms to human ends - 
or at least enable people to free themselves from domination by these forms.  
This drama is illustrated by responses of intellectuals, academics and artists to the 
autonomous dynamics of capitalism. In the nineteenth century economists, modelling their 
discipline on physics,64 came to regard the economy as an end in itself, and people only as of 
significance if they were utilizable by the economy. Malthus exemplified this attitude. In 
opposition to this Marx produced a narrative which cast the economic system, functioning 
according to dynamics transcending people's intentions, as an aberration which people, or at 
least those most oppressed by this system, the proletariat, were called upon to overcome. In the 
twentieth century John Maynard Keynes offered an alternative narrative according to which 
the market need not be abolished, but could and should be reduced to an instrument for 
human ends. This does not mean that Marx and Keynes did not use abstract forms of 
reasoning and analysis (or for that matter, engage in empirical research). But for the most part, 
they did not commit what Whitehead called 'the fallacy of misplaced concreteness' and take 
these abstractions for reality, although Marxists and Keynesians certainly did, and both Marx 
and Keynes occasionally gave them some justification for doing so.65 Their abstractions were 
ultimately subordinated to their narratives that offered people the possibility of taking 
responsibility for the future, for regaining control of the dynamics of society in the interests of 
64 This has been demonstrated by Andrew S. Skinner, A System of Social Science: Papers Relating to Adam Smith, (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1979).  
65 See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, [1925], (New York: Mentor, 1948), p.52. Whitehead 
himself criticised this tendency in economics (ibid. p.179). Marxists often interpret Marx as an economist who 
discovered the laws of development of humanity, ignoring the subtitle of Capital: ‘A Critique of Political Economy’. 
Keynes has been criticized by Geoffrey Hodgson for forgetting history, but his failing was not comparable to the 
‘barren universality’ of his successors. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical 
Specificity in the Social Sciences, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, chaps. 15, 16 & 17. 
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human welfare. Neo-classical economists associated with the rise of neo-liberalism, embracing a 
positivistic philosophy of science and infatuated by mathematics and computer models are 
again construing humans as cogs of the economic machine, this time, of the global economic 
machine, debasing people to 'human resources'.66 Those responding to neo-liberalism are 
fighting a rearguard action to revive the tradition of historical thinking in economics, both of 
economic theory and of the institutions of the economy.67 More specifically, those attempting to 
expose how institutions are being corrupted and debased are retelling their histories. Bill 
Readings book The University in Ruins illustrates this.68 Such histories are the first step in fighting 
such debasement.  
What is the relationship between narratives and individuals? It is essentially through 
narratives that individuals become more than the conditions of their existence. It is individuals 
who utilize the inherent reflexivity of the narrative form to question the narratives they have 
been encultured by and socialized into, who consider alternative versions of these narratives, 
who begin to construct their lives as unfinished stories in relation to chosen versions of the 
stories of the communities and organizations within which they are participating, who thereby 
take responsibility for their own lives and the culture of their society, who are the creative 
agents of culture, of society and of history.69 Such people are 'authentic' - authors of their own 
becoming.70 The kinds of narrative that can be developed will of course be dependent upon 
social conditions. As Lucien Goldmann noted, the first phase of capitalism had a place for a 
stratum of individuals who could play ‘an active and responsible role in economic, social and 
political life, and therefore in cultural life’.71 It was in this environment that the Bildungsroman 
developed, a narrative of self-education and self-development.72 As social reality became 
increasingly irrational, the works of Franz Kafka and the existentialist and absurdist writers 
who followed him revealed the angst of striving to give narrative coherence to one’s life in a 
66 On this, see Philip Mirowski, 'Shall I Compare Thee to a Minkowski-Ricardo-Leontief-Metzler Matrix of the 
Hicks-Mosak Kind?', Economics and Philosophy, 3, (1987): 67-96. Mirowski is one of the most trenchant critic of the 
mathematization of economics. See also his Against Mechanism: Protecting Economics from Science, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1988; More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1989 and 
Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
67 See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science, (London: 
Routledge, 2001). See also Alex Callinicos, Theories and Narratives: Reflections on the Philosophy of History, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995). 
68 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
69 The relationship between narratives and personal identity has been explored by Ricoeur in the essays in Oneself as 
Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992). However, perhaps the 
best and most interesting study of this derives from the study of a very young child in Katherine Nelson ed., Narratives 
from the Crib, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). On the other hand, Jürgen Habermas has 
represented the capacity to organize one's own life as a biography as the highest stage of moral development. See 
'Moral Development and Ego Identity', Communication and the Evolution of Society, [1976], (London: Heinemann, 1975), 
p.87. 
70 Carr has defended the notion of authenticity in such terms in Time, Narrative, and History, pp.86-94. 
71 Lucien Goldmann, Sociology of the Novel, trans. Alan Sheridan, (N.Y.: Tavistock, 1975), p.169. 
72 On this, see Franco Moeretti, The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture, (London: Verso, 1987). 
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world dominated by incomprehensible social forms and mindless functionaries. In a world that 
has rendered people totally powerless within a global market, ‘postmodern’ narratives such as 
Brett Easton Ellis’ American Psycho, have attempted to portray life where there is not only no 
coherence in the social order, but all attempts by individuals to achieve narrative coherence in 
their own lives have been abandoned. But to construct narratives about this, historical or 
fictional, is to rebel against such incoherence. Postmodernists who debunk narratives as such 
are effectively capitulating to the triumph of the global market and corporate power. It is 
people struggling for both coherence and adequacy to the world through narratives who are the 
opponents of decadence, the decay of the narratives being lived out and the dominance of 
emergent social forms with dynamics inimical to creative freedom and human dignity. It is they 
who regenerate democratic institutions and societies by reformulating and reviving old, or 
creating new narrative forms.  
CONCLUSION 
As I proposed to do at the beginning of this essay, I have presented a very schematic 
narrative. However, it does provide an example of what a narrative is, and now, very briefly I 
will review what I have presented. To begin with, I have offered an emplotment, a unification 
of a diversity of events, ideas and developments into one action. This 'action' consists of a 
number of constituent 'actions'. Firstly, Greek philosophy, defining negatively 'culture' as the 
changing ephemeral aspects of human society, thought and beliefs in opposition to knowledge 
of what is eternal, and the consolidation of this with the development of modern science; 
secondly, the inversion argued for by Vico which made 'culture' the privileged object of inquiry 
and conceived of science as part of culture; thirdly, the 'naming' of culture by Herder and the 
development of the notion of diverse 'cultures', together with the suggestion that it is our 
understanding of nature which needs to be brought into line with this notion of humans as 
cultured, creative beings; fourthly, the elaboration by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and his 
followers of Herder's ideas, postulating three dimensions of culture, and the subsequent 
development of the humanities, further elaborating the concept of culture - although without 
succeeding in displacing the mechanistic view of humans promulgated by the 'hard' sciences; 
fifthly, the breakdown within science of the project of gaining knowledge of the eternal reality 
behind appearances and the development of a conception of nature as a process of creative 
becoming justifying the view of humans developed in the humanities, together with the 
resolution of epistemological problems in the natural sciences by recourse to narrative; sixthly 
the crisis of narrative associated with postmodernism, neo-liberalism and the globalization of 
the economy inspiring the development of narratology which is now further enriching our 
understanding of all dimensions of culture, of individuality, and of what it is to be human.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The presentation of this narrative has been at the same time an evaluation of the events 
recounted, suggesting that a culture which celebrates the eternal, since it will assume there is 
only one truth, will tend to be aggressive, intolerant and oppressive towards other cultures; but 
more significantly, suggesting that this celebration is wrong. Although in the schematic form in 
114 COSMOS AND HISTORY 
which I have presented it only those sympathetic to my position will be convinced by this 
narrative, narratives, to the extent they are successful, compel agreement with the value 
judgements being made. And narratives do not merely compel intellectual agreement. They 
address people's way of engaging in the world, their orientations for action, the way they live, 
and orient them to live differently.  
What is being suggested is that at this stage of history, with all that is associated with the 
humanities, and even the sciences now that they are breaking out of the Platonist mould, under 
threat from the autonomous dynamics of the economic system and those who serve it: corrupt 
governments, careerist administrators and academics, and most importantly, the high priests of 
global market forces, neo-classical economists, one of the most important intellectual tasks is the 
defence of narrative. This task is being undertaken not only by literary and film theorists, but 
also by psychologists (Donald Polkinghorne,73 Jerome Bruner, and many others), philosophers 
(pre-eminently, Ricoeur, MacIntyre and Carr), economists (Mirowski and Hodgson) and 
radical social theorists (Callinicos).74 Rather than reducing humans to objects to be controlled, 
narratologists are attacking social problems by critically investigating the narratives dominating 
people's lives, and showing how they can be empowered, how they can become authentic 
agents, by reflecting on the narratives they are living out, gaining access to new narrative forms 
and by participating in the creation of new narratives. The narrative I have offered here is a 
defence of their work and a call for further work in this direction.  
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